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Abstract
‘Instantiation-directed slot theorists’ believe that properties/relations have slots which
are filled by their instances/relata e.g., where Abigail is taller than Bronia, there are two
slots in the relation Taller Than such that Abigail fills the first slot and Bronia fills the
second. This crude statement of the theory runs into ‘The Problem of Filling’, whereby
a natural understanding of the relation between slots, filling, and instantiation leads to
absurd results. This paper examines a variety of solutions to that problem, one of which
is an extension of slot theory that adds an additional category of entities, ‘slotites’.
Keywords Properties . Ontology. Slot theory . Neutral relations . Symmetric relations .
Bundle theory . Symmetric dependence
1 Introduction
1.1 Slot Theory
Slot theorists believe that, in addition to properties/relations existing, there exist ‘slots’
Dixon (2018b: 56n15) lists those who endorse it; (Dixon (2018a) and Gilmore (2013)
defend it in-depth). As a, somewhat crass, first pass understanding, imagine the slot
theorist says that every property/relation possesses a number of slots equal to its adicity
e.g. Red has one slot and Married has two slots.
To progress this crass understanding, we have two alternatives. One is that slots are
proposition-directed: a proposition is grounded in the slots of a property/relation being
filled by entities ((Gilmore 2014); see also Williamson (1985: 257)) e.g. the (false)
proposition 〈Nikk Effingham hates Barack Obama〉 is grounded in facts involving
Hates having two slots, one being filled by myself and the other being filled by Obama.
Grossman (1992: 57) thinks both actualised and unactualised states of affairs exist
and result from filling slots of properties—this would be a variation on proposition-
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directed slots.) The second alternative way of understanding slots is instantiation-
directed whereby slots are filled by the different relata of the relation (or instances of
the property). For instance, Red’s slot could be filled by a red ball which instantiates
Red whilst Married’s slots would be filled by pairs of spouses. In this paper, I focus
solely on instantiation-directed slots, since they are the slots which I find most appeal to
my metaphysical sensibilities. (Although I suspect that some of the issues discussed in
this paper can be ported over to proposition-directed slots.)1
Start by sketching a (somewhat crude) theory of instantiation-directed slots. It would
have the following three pieces of (possibly primitive, possibly non-primitive) ideology:
(CSs) ‘__ is a slot’ (which holds of slots).
(CSp) ‘__ is possessed by __’ (the first relatum is a slot; the second relatum is a
property/relation).
(CSf) ‘__ fills __’ (the first relatum is a relatum/instance of a relation/property; the
second relatum is a slot possessed by that relation/property).
For example, if some x fills the slot possessed by Red then x instantiates Red. And in
the case of Taller Than—which has two slots, σ1 and σ2—we would end up with the
following bi-conditional:
≡CRUDE: For any x and y, x and y jointly instantiate Taller Than—and x is thereby
taller than y—iff x fills σ1 and y fills σ2.
1.2 The Problem of Filling (POF)
≡CRUDE is too crude (Dixon (2018a: 201–04) also notes the following problem). Imagine:
Abigail is taller than Bronia and both are fully grownwomen of a tall stature; Clare is taller
than Damaris, but both are young children who are both short comparable to Abigail and
Bronia i.e. neither Clare nor Damaris are taller than Abigail or Bronia. Given filling is a
dyadic relation between a relation’s relatum and one of its slots: Abigail fills σ1 whilst
Bronia fills σ2 (for Abigail is taller than Bronia); Clare fills σ1 and Damaris fills σ2 (for
Clare is taller than Damaris); but then, given ≡CRUDE, Clare is thereby taller than Bronia.
Since that’s false, we have a problem. Call this the Problem of Filling (POF for short).
This paper discusses how slot theorists can try to solve POF, using it as a chance to
survey different slot theories. §§2–4 discuss slot theories which relativise filling to
some further entity: instantiations (§2); sums, pluralities, or ordered tuples (§3); and
spacetime regions (§4). I then discuss an extension which adds in an extra ontological
category to help—‘slotites’ (§5). It not only solves POF but also solves a problem with
symmetric relations. §§6–8 discuss different varieties of slotite theory.
Note that this paper does not argue for a specific theory; whilst some have clear
downsides, the remainder all have their charms. Rather, this paper is an exploration of
logical space, surveying the different theories available and seeing the different meta-
physical itches which they can scratch.
1 This paragraph, particularly the references to proposition-directed slot theorists, was heavily informed by an
anonymous referee’s comments.
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2 Instantiation Relative Slot Theory
Roughly speaking, Dixon’s suggestion (2008a: 204) is to relativize filling to instanti-
ations. Call that ‘Instantiation Relative Slot Theory’. Treating instantiations as states of
affairs, we replace (CSf) with:
(IRf) ‘__ fills __ relative to __’ (the first relatum is a relatum/instance of a relation/
property; the second relatum is a slot possessed by that relation/property; the third
relatum is the state of affairs of the relatum/instance of the relation/property
instantiating the relation/property).
Thus, Abigail and Bronia fill σ1 and σ2 relative to their instantiation of the Taller Than
relation, whilst Clare and Damaris fill those slots relative to their instantiation; there is
also an instantiation involving Bronia and Clare, but relative to that instantiation Bronia
fills σ1 and it is Clare who fills σ2. Problem solved. Instead of ≡CRUDE, Instantiation
Relative Slot Theorists endorse:
≡INSREL For any x and y, x and y jointly instantiate Taller Than iff there exists an
instantiation, ϑ, and both (i) x fills σ1 relative to ϑ, and (ii) y fills σ2 relative to ϑ.
Some might want to avoid Instantiation Relative Slot Theory. To see why, first we must
better understand the relationship between filling and instantiation. Whilst slot theorists
will agree that there is a bi-conditional connection between filling and instantiation (e.g.
≡INSREL or ≡CRUDE), they’ll vary over which side of the bi-conditional is more fundamental
than the other. There are three types of fact: facts about which slots are filled (‘filling
facts’); facts about which instances/relata instantiate which property/relation (‘instanti-
ation facts’); facts about what the instances/relata are like (e.g. the ball being red or Jack
and Jim being married; call them ‘predicational facts’). We then end up with three
different views over how these facts relate to the bi-conditional: FILLING FIRST is the
principle that filling facts ground instantiation and predicational facts; INSTANTIATION
FIRST is the principle that instantiation facts ground filling and predicational facts;
PREDICATION FIRST is the principle that predicational facts ground filling and instantiation
facts.2 (I ignore the prima facie implausible idea that these facts are independent of one
another.) Which of FILLING FIRST, INSTANTIATION FIRST, and PREDICATION FIRST you opt for
obviously determines which side of ≡INSREL is more fundamental than the other.
Having assumed that instantiations are states of affairs/facts, instantiations are either
predicational facts or instantiation facts. For instance, in the case of Abigail and Bronia,
the relevant instantiation of Taller than would either be the fact that Abigail is taller
than Bronia or the fact that Abigail and Bronia jointly instantiate Taller than. Which-
ever it is, represent it using T. Given FILLING FIRST, T ontologically depends upon filling
facts about σ1 and σ2—only once we have those filling facts can we ‘build’ T. But if
≡INSREL is true then filling must be relative to T. Since, Meinongianism aside, something
can only bear a relation to an existent thing, we have a problem. Abigail can only fill σ1
if T already exists (in order for her filling of σ1 to be relativised to T) but T depends on
2 I talk about ‘grounding’, ‘priority’, and ‘fundamentality’ with some measure of abandon. Feel free to adopt
your metametaphysics of choice and parse what I say into your favoured lingo.
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the filling fact; thus T depends upon the filling fact, but the filling fact depends upon T.
Given the standard assumption that dependence is asymmetric, instantiation relative
slot theory can’t be combined with FILLING FIRST.
This is not a problem for all slot theorists. If a slot theorist endorses PREDICATION
FIRST (and adds that the derivative instantiation facts further explain fillings facts) or
endorses INSTANTIATION FIRST, then we don’t get this problem. In both cases, T would
exist before the filling facts and would thus be a suitable relatum of the filling relation.
(And note that Dixon explicitly endorses PREDICATION FIRST (Dixon 2018b) so he, at
least, has no problem.)
So this is not an objection which will faze all slot theorists. However, there are things
to be said for FILLING FIRST being true. A reason to be a slot theorist would be for slots to
explain the order of relations. Return to Abigail and Bronia. They both instantiate
Taller Than, but we need more than this; as is, their joint instantiation of Taller Than is
compatible both with Abigail being taller than Bronia as well as Bronia being taller
than Abigail. We must say that their instantiation is ordered in some way (e.g. such that
Abigail comes first and then Bronia, or vice versa). Whilst we may take this ordering to
be a primitive feature of instantiation, receiving no further metaphysical explanation,
we might equally try and find some explanation for this ordering. And it’s natural for
slots to be the answer to that search (cf (Fine 2000)): Abigail is taller than Bronia
because she fills slot σ1 whilst Bronia fills σ2 (rather than vice versa). Were slots to play
this role, instantiation facts must be explained by filling facts (elsewise the more fine-
grained filling facts would be explained by the coarse-grained, unordered, instantiation
facts, rallying against the principle that the more fundamental a fact is, the more fine
grained it is). Thus, if you want to explain the order of instantiation (a laudable goal!)
then you must favour FILLING FIRST over INSTANTIATION FIRST.3 Whilst this is not a reason
to favour FILLING FIRST over PREDICATION FIRST (for we might think some predicational
fact explains Abigail filling σ1/Bronia filling σ2, which in turn explains their joint
instantiation of Taller Than), since INSTANTIATION FIRST is prima facie plausible, FILLING
FIRST must be as well. So we have some reason to think FILLING FIRST is true. That
said—and purely in the interests of metaphysical exploration—§§3–4 assume that
FILLING FIRST is true and try to find alternative solutions to POF which salvage it.
3 Entity Relative Slot Theory
The next two sections consider theories that solve POF by relativizing to entities other
than instantiations. The first such theory, suggested to me by Donnchadh O’Conaill, is
to relativise filling to the respective entities involved. For single slot properties, this
3 If slots explain the order of relations, the filling relation must itself be unordered. Usually this is unprob-
lematic; Abigail standing in the filling relation to σ1 (and Bronia to σ2) is (setting POF worries aside!) enough
for us to know that both instantiate Taller Than and that Abigail is taller than Bronia. The filling relation need
not be ordered because one relata is clearly the slot and the other clearly isn’t. But it becomes problematic were
slots to instantiate properties, for in such cases slots fill slots and order becomes pertinent. Assume that Being
Abstract has a single slot, σA. Since σ1 is abstract, σ1 instantiates Being Abstract and does so because (given
FILLING FIRST) it fills σA. Order is now important! σA and σ1 stand in the filling relation, but we need to know
whether the former fills the latter or the latter fills the former. Conclusion: Slot theorists looking to explain
order will need to ban (at the fundamental level, at least) slots instantiating properties.
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would be unproblematic. For instance, the red ball would fill Red’s single slot relative
to the red ball, whilst a red pen fills Red’s slot relative to that red pen. But things
become problematic when we try the same thing with relations for it’s then unclear
what exactly do their relata fill their slots relative to? A natural answer would be the
mereological sum of the relata. But imagine Rness is a two-place many-one relation
corresponding to a relational predicate R. Rness has two slots, σ°1 and σ°2. Imagine a,
b, and c exist, such that:
(a) a and b stand in R to c;
(b) b and c stand in R to a;
(c) no other instances of R hold.
Having relativized filling to mereological sums, we should endorse:
≡ENREL For any x (or xs) and y, xRy (or xsRy) iff (i) x (or the xs) fills σ°1 relative to
the mereological sum composed of the xs plus y; and (ii) y fills σ°2 relative to that
same sum.
Given (a) and ≡ENREL c fills σ°2 relative to the mereological sum a + b + c. Given (b) and
≡ENREL the plurality of b and c fill σ°1 relative to a + b + c. Therefore, given ≡ENREL, the
plurality of b and c are R-related to c which, given (c), is false. So mereological sums
can’t play the relativizing role. (And we get the same problem if we relativized filling to
pluralities of the relata instead of mereological sums of them e.g. if c filled σ°2 relative
to the plurality of a, b and c.)
The problem comes about because mereological sums are blind to the ‘order’ of
their constituents (and pluralities are blind to the order of the things amongst
them4). But some entities have a metaphysical structure better suited to capturing
such order. States of affairs are an obvious example, but if we start using them we’ll
end up back at Instantiation Relative Slot Theory (for what state of affairs could be
salient if not the state of affairs of the objects instantiating the relevant relation?).
But there is another alternative: Ordered tuples. In that case, given (a), a and b fill
σ°1 relative to 〈{a,b},c〉 and c fills σ°2 relative to 〈{a,b},c〉. Given (b), b and c fill
σ°1 relative to 〈{b,c},a〉 and a fills σ°2 relative to 〈{b,c},a〉. Unlike with
mereological sums, the entities playing the relativizing role (i.e. 〈{a,b},c〉 and
4 That pluralities are unordered (i.e. that the plurality x, y, z is the same plurality as z, y, x) is orthodoxy. Hewitt
(2012) advances a heterodox view whereby plural terms refer to things in a certain order. We can capture this
using subscripts e.g. xl, ym, zn (where l, m, n… are, possibly identical, numbers corresponding to the
appropriate order). In ‘Tom, Dick, and Harry came into the room’, ‘Tom, Dick, and Harry’ would refer to
an ordered plurality, e.g. Tom1, Dick2, Harry3. If ‘ordered pluralities’ were not solely a linguistic phenomenon,
and also featured in our fundamental metaphysics, ordered pluralities could solve POF. Returning to the
example in the main text, we could say c fills σ°1 relative to a1, b1, c2 whilst a fills σ°1 relative to a2, b1, c1.
Ordered pluralities are not absurd. But I relegate discussion of them to this footnote because, at least in the
linguistic case, Hewitt’s proposal is not fully general. Florio and Nicolas (2015) provide counterexamples.
Consider: ‘Tom, Dick, and Harry arrived in the order they were born but left in the order they were appointed’.
In that sentence the plural term ‘Tom, Dick, and Harry’ would problematically have to refer to different
ordered pluralities (one corresponding to the order of birth, the other to order of appointment). This isn’t
necessarily the end of the matter for there might not be analogous counterexamples at the level of fundamental
metaphysics; whatever the case, I shan’t discuss the proposal any further.
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〈{b,c},a〉) aren’t identical and thus we can’t generate the problem we had with sums
and pluralities.
I don’t deny that relativizing to ordered tuples is an open option. However, having
brought ordered tuples into the picture wemight want to pause as to whywe don’t go the
whole hog and endorse class nominalism. What complaint could be raised against such
an endorsement? It cannot be that class nominalism requires classes to exist, since that’s
part-and-parcel of relativizing to tuples. Nor can the complaint be that class nominalism
requires arbitrarily identifying tuples with sets (Benacerraf 1965) since that same
problem faces Entity Relative Slot Theory. And so on for every complaint. Having
already roped in ordered pairs, class nominalism should be a natural theory to endorse.
So if you are attracted to Entity Relative Slot Theory, I suggest you should be a class
nominalist. One might think that class nominalism is incompatible with slot theory;
after all, Gilmore explicitly ties slot theory to Platonic universals (Gilmore 2013: 187).
But I see no reason to deny that non-Platonic universals (e.g. immanent universals,
mereological fusions, or classes) could have slots. Just as the Platonist introduces slots
as sui generis entities standing in a primitive ‘possession’ relationship to a property, we
can say exactly the same for these other theories. With little said about what ‘posses-
sion’ amounts to (because the Platonist doesn’t offer even a rudimentary analysis of it!)
there’s no impediment to saying that non-Platonic universals can ‘possess’ sui generis
slots (see also Effingham (2020): 171).5
The problem is not that class nominalism is inconsistent with slot theory. Rather, the
problem is that—at the stage in the dialectic we are in—we further need FILLING FIRST to
be true. And that’s a step too far because stereotypical class nominalists (e.g. Lewis 1986:
50–69) endorse PREDICATION FIRST, not FILLING FIRST. And the closest alternative to a class
nominalism accepting PREDICATION FIRST is a class nominalism which says that instances/
relata instantiate properties/relations in virtue of beingmembers of an ordered tuple that’s
a member of that property/relation. But then, since facts about membership are grounded
solely in facts about what exists in tandem with the axioms of set theory, there’d be no
room for filling facts to play a role in explaining instantiation facts i.e. FILLING FIRST must
be false even given this alternative understanding of class nominalism.
In summation: I don’t deny that there’s room in logical space for relativising filling
to ordered tuples. But, as this section has explained, it does raise awkward questions
about the motivation for such a theory: Given there are ordered tuples playing a crucial
5 This footnote dashes the hopes that class nominalists can reduce slots to some other kind of set-theoretic
entities. Imagine four objects, a-d, and three relations, Rness, Rness*, and Rness’ (which correspond to the
relational predicates ‘__R__’, ‘__R*__’, and ‘__R’__’). Assume: Rab, Rcd, R*ab, R*cc, R’ab, and R’dd are all
and only the true facts. It follows that:
Rness ¼ f 〈a; b〉; 〈c; d〉 g Rness* ¼ f 〈a; b〉; 〈c; c〉 g Rness’ ¼ f 〈a; b〉; 〈d ; d〉 g
The underlining represents which ‘bit of the set’ corresponds to the ‘first slot’. I can think of only two
reductions of slots to sets. Neither works; at least, not if we assume slots theorists want to rule out relations
‘sharing’ slots. First Reduction: Slots are ordered tuples consisting of the underlined element corresponding to
the slot. In that case the first slot of Rness would be: { 〈a〉, 〈c〉}. But applying the same thinking to Rness* we
get that the same set is the first slot of Rness*. Second Reduction: Assume a Lockean principle of abstraction
which ‘abstracts away’ selected ur-elements from that set, replacing the appropriate relata with unbound
variables (just as open sentences replace names in sentences with unbound variables). The first slot of Rness
would be identical to{ 〈x, b〉, 〈x, d〉}. But we get the same result for Rness’.
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role in our metaphysical scheme, why not be a class nominalist? And if you’re a class
nominalist, how do you square that with FILLING FIRST?
4 Spatiotemporal Relative Slot Theory
Spacetime is a dimension along which we commonly find variation of facts. I am tall
now, but short then; the kilt is red in one place, green in another; it is raining in
Birmingham, but not in Madrid. So it’s natural to relativise filling facts to regions of
spacetime—a slot may be filled by something in one place but unfilled in another, just
as whether ‘here’ is occupied by matter may vary as you move across space. Call this
‘Spatiotemporal Relative Slot Theory’. It’s natural to add that slots would themselves
be spatiotemporally located, presumably occupying wherever the relevant relata are
(and, equally, it’d be natural to assume that properties are likewise located, either being
immanent universals or mereological fusions). We replace (CSf)/(IRf) with:
(SRf) ‘__ fills __ relative to __’ (the first relatum is a relatum/instance of a relation/
property; the second relatum is a slot possessed by that relation/property; the third
relatum is a spacetime region).
And then endorse:
≡STREL For any x and y, x and y jointly instantiate Taller Than iff there exists some
spacetime region, α, and both (i) x fills σ1 relative to α, and (ii) y fills σ2 relative to
α.
(Filling is region-relative, whilst instantiating the property is not; this is as it should be.)
Reconsider POF’s problematic example case in light of ≡STREL. Imagine Abigail,
Bronia, Clare, and Damaris respectively exactly occupy four regions, ra, rb, rc, and rd.
Abigail fills σ1 relative to ra∪rb; Bronia fills σ2 relative to ra∪rb; Clare fills σ1 relative to
rc∪rd; Damaris fills σ2 relative to rc∪rd; Bronia fills σ1 relative to rb∪rc whilst Clare fills
σ2 relative to rb∪rc; and so on. Because the thing we relativize to is appropriately
different each time, POF appears to have been solved.
But spacetime relativisations are always an awkward beast since it’s possible that
there exist superposed entities e.g. superposed bosons, statues and lumps of clay, or
ghosts and the walls they walk through. Imagine that four bosons exist, b1-b4; b1 and b4
spin whilst b2 and b3 do not; b1 and b2 are superposed (and exactly occupy r1); b3 and b4
are superposed (and exactly occupy r4). Bosons are spinlike, and jointly instantiate the
relation Spinlike, iff they have the same spin. Thus b1 and b4 jointly instantiate Spinlike,
as do b2 and b3. σ′1 and σ′2 are the two slots which Spinlike possesses. Thus: b1 fills σ′1
relative to r1∪r4 (because b1 has the same spin as b4) whilst b4 fills σ′2 relative to r1∪r4
(for similar reasons). The same thing is true of b2 and b3. Now the problem creeps back
in: Relative to r1∪r4, b1 (which spins) fills σ′1 and b3 (which doesn’t spin) fills σ′2.
Given ≡STREL, b1 and b3 jointly instantiate Spinlike, which is ex hypothesi false.
One could deny the possibility of superposed objects. But for everyone who admits
their possibility—which includes myself—some other alternative must be found if we
want a slot theory that allows for FILLING FIRST.
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5 Slotite Theory
5.1 Slotites
To get a different style of solution, we should compare POF to the problem of
temporary intrinsics (Wasserman 2006). Roughly speaking, there are two styles
of response to that problem: (i) endurantists relativise instantiation to times (or
spacetime points, or utilise time-relativised adverbs etc.); (ii) perdurantists, rather
than relativising instantiation, add in extra ontology (i.e. temporal parts) to do
the work. When it comes to POF I’ve discussed options which relativise filling;
those responses are analogous to endurantist responses to the problem of tem-
porary intrinsics. It’s not hard, though, to imagine a response analogous to
perdurantism. We add in extra ontology, ‘slotites’, to solve POF. Just as the
perdurantist demands a plethora of temporal parts (one for every instant that an
object exists at), slotite theorists commit to a plethora of slotites. For now,
imagine that every property/relation has a number of slotites equal to its adicity
multiplied by the number of its instantiations, such that each instantiation gets its
own, distinct slotites. (I say assume this ‘for now’ because I’ll later suggest that
the number of slotites may only be at least as many as this.) For example,
returning to Abigail, Bronia, Clare, and Damaris, there are six instantiations of
Taller than (Abigail being taller than Bronia, Bronia being taller than Clare,
Abigail being taller than Damaris etc.). Since Taller than is dyadic, there must
then be twelve slotites, τ1, τ2…τ12. Having used ‘filling’ for the relation between
slots and instances, use ‘plug’ for the similar relation between slotites and
instances. One pair of slotites, τ1 and τ2, are plugged by Abigail and Bronia
respectively; another pair, τ3 and τ4, are plugged by Clare and Damaris respec-
tively; similarly, for Abigail and Clare, Abigail and Damaris, Bronia and Clare,
and Bronia and Damaris. The slotite theorist then adds that these pairs are
‘yoked together’ so that we know which slotites ‘hook up’ with which other
slotites. Thus τ1 and τ2 are yoked, τ3 and τ4 are yoked, τ5 and τ6 are yoked etc.
and no other pairs are yoked i.e. τ1 and τ3 aren’t yoked, nor τ1 and τ4, nor τ1
and τ5 etc.
(Technically, things don’t plug slotites and it’s instead their temporal parts which do
the plugging. For any two (possibly identical) times, t and t′, such that Abigail exists at t
and Bronia at t′, there’s a pairing of Abigail’s t-temporal part, at, and Bronia’s t′-
temporal part, bt′. For each pairing: distinct slotites exist, τα and τβ; at plugs τα; bt′
plugs τβ; τα and τβ are yoked. For ease of presentation, I’ll ignore this complication
about temporal parts.)
Slotite theory needs different ideology than slot theory:
(STsl) ‘__ is a slotite’ (which holds of slotites).
(STp) ‘__ is possessed by __’ (the first relatum is a slotite; the second relatum is a
property/relation).
(STf) ‘__ plugs __’ (the first relatum is a relatum/instance of a relation/
property; the second relatum is a slotite possessed by that relation/
property).
(STy) ‘__ are yoked together’ (which holds of a plurality of slotites).
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Regarding Taller than, slotite theorists say:
≡SLOTITE For any x and y, x and y jointly instantiate Taller Than iff there exist two
slotites, τx and τy, such that: (i) x plugs τx; (ii) y plugs τy; (iii) τx and τy are yoked;
(iv) τx and τy are both possessed by Taller Than.
≡SLOTITE, plus the facts about which slotites are yoked, solves POF. It can also avoid the
problem of superposed objects. Since b1 and b4 are spinlike-related, they have their own
pair of yoked slotites which they plug; b2 and b3 are likewise. When it comes to b1 and
b2 the slotite theorist will either say that, because they aren’t spinlike-related, either
there isn’t a pair of slotites or (if the slotite theorist is willing to add in more slotites)
there is a pair of yoked slotites, but they go unplugged. Whichever is the case, ≡SLOTITE
entails that b1 and b4 are spinlike-related, as are b2 and b3. But b1 and b2 are not.
Problem solved!
5.2 Objections to Slotite Theory
Objection One Slotite theory demands an increase in one’s ontology, for now there are
a lot of slotites. But, just as perdurantism’s extra ontological commitments aren’t
normally thought to be a deal breaker, we should say the same of slotite theory.
Objection Two One may complain that, whilst slots are an intuitive category of entity,
slotites are weird, contrived, and/or otiose. But we should, again, compare the theory to
perdurantism. Just as perdurantism ‘unearths’ a commitment to temporal parts that were
originally thought to be a bizarre category of entity (Chisholm 1976: 143; Geach 1972:
311; van Inwagen 1981: 133), slotite theorists should treat their theory as having made
an ontological discovery. Just as people came to grips with temporal parts, I’m sure that
if we spent long enough trucking in slotites rather than slots they’d become quite
natural items of one’s ontology.
Objection Three Slotites must come in different ‘flavours’. Consider the pair of
yoked slotites, τ1 and τ2, plugged by Abigail and Bronia respectively. There must
be something about these slotites which means that Abigail plugging τ1 and Bronia
plugging τ2 makes the former taller than the latter; τ1 must be a ‘tall-flavoured’
slotite whilst τ2 must be a ‘short-flavoured’ slotite. But what explains these
flavours?
Such concerns are dialectically inappropriate, because we’re comparing slotite
theory to slot theories and their variants. Even the most vanilla slot theorist will already
have something to say about such ‘flavouring’, saying: Taller than possesses two slots;
Abigail fills one slot; Bronia fills the other; something about these slots means that
what fills the first slot is the thing which is tall compared to the shorter thing which fills
the other slot. But in that case, slots also have ‘flavours’. (See also Fine's 2000: 10)
diagrammatic representation of positionalism, which represents the slots differently—
that is, as having different flavours—and purposefully captures exactly this idea (Fine
2000: 10). And if slots have flavours, why not slotites? Alternatively, the slot theorist
may roll out some reason why they don’t need slots to have flavours—but then I expect
that the same reasoning will apply to slotites!
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It is doubly dialectically inappropriate if, as we’re currently assuming, we are realists
who deny PREDICATION FIRST. Then a ball is red in virtue of it instantiating Red. So either
something about Red explains why its instances are red (in which case properties come
in different ‘flavours’—why not, then, slotites?) or nothing does (and, again, why can’t
we then say slotites don’t need flavours either?).
Objection Four We’ve stopped talking about slots and so slotite theory isn’t really a
variant of slot theory. But slots can be easily recovered. Just as temporal parts compose
objects, slotites could compose slots. Assuming that both slotites and slots come in
flavours, slots would be fusions of all and only the slotites of the same flavour e.g. one
slot of Taller than is composed of the first slotite of every pair of yoked slotites, whilst
the other slot is composed of the remainder. (We can further analyse filling slots in
terms of plugging slotites that are parts of the slot; similarly, we can say that a property
possesses a slot iff it possesses the slotites composing the slot.)
Objection Five Slotite theory threatens believing in properties in the first place. All of
the heavy lifting in our metaphysical theory is being carried out by things plugging
slotites of certain flavours. We need no longer explain why red things are red in terms
of their instantiating Red when we can explain their being red in terms of plugging a
certain flavour of slotite.
One option is to admit this and drop properties in favour of slotites. Another option
is to recover properties in the same way that slots were recovered. Properties would be
composed by the slotites that they possess.6 Properties would be derivative entities,
much like a table is derivative of its atoms. And just as the derivative nature of tables is
no slight against the existence of tables, the derivative nature of properties would be no
slight against properties.
Objection Six One may worry that slotites are just tropes in all but name. But this isn’t
the case. Admittedly, in monadic cases they seem the same. Consider some red balls.
The trope theorist says that, for each ball, there exists a distinct particular i.e. a distinct
red trope. The slotite theorist says that, for each ball, there exists a distinct particular i.e.
a distinct slotite. But in polyadic cases, the similarity ends. If the trope theorist admits
of relational tropes, then two spinlike bosons are related by a single spinlike trope. But
the slotite theorist says there are two things i.e. the two yoked slotites. Demonstrably,
slotites and tropes are different.
What I don’t deny is that we might be able to build up connections between tropes
and slotites. Just as properties and slots were identified with fusions of slotites, we can
6 It’s a bit odd to say properties ‘possess’ slotites when the slotites are ontologically prior to the property.
Better to say that properties are composed of ‘property forming’ slotites. We can then analyse possession in
terms of that. Assume that, for every different flavour of slotite, there’s a primitive monadic predicate applying
to the slotite e.g. ‘__ is flavour1’, ‘__ is flavour2’ etc. (This assumption could be dispensable, depending upon
how we treat the issue of flavours of slotites/properties.) The relation ‘__ has the same flavour as __’ is
definable in terms of those predicates. Further, we can define a disjunctive relation ‘__ either has the same
flavour as __, or is yoked to it’. Call the ancestral of that relation Θ. Define:
The xs are property forming = df The xs are slotites which are Θ-related to one another and nothing which
is Θ-related to any x fails to be amongst the xs.
Fness is a property = df Fness is composed out of property forming slotites.
Fness possesses slotite τ =df τ is amongst the slotites which compose Fness.
Philosophia
say the same of tropes—slotites are the distinct ‘legs’ of a relational trope and tropes are
‘built up’ out of slotites. An unyoked slotite, e.g. the slotite possessed by Red and
plugged by a ball, is a trope. Similarly, a fusion of maximally yoked slotites is a trope.
So tropes are ontologically reducible to slotites.
5.3 The Problem of Symmetric Relations
Slotite theory solves POF. It also solves Fine's (2000: 17–22) problem for slot theory
when it comes to symmetric relations. Non-symmetric relations have slots with differ-
ent flavours and it’s clear which relatum fills which slot. But with symmetric relations
things are problematic. Spinlike has two slots, σ′1 and σ′2; spinlike-related bosons, like
b1 and b4, fill those slots. But either slot is as good as the other when it comes to such
filling. Perhaps (i) b1 fills σ′1 and b4 fills σ′2 but equally we might say (ii) b1 fills σ′2 and
b4 fills σ′1. In (i) and (ii) different slots are being filled by different things, thus they’re
distinct states of affairs. But clearly (i) and (ii) are the same state of affairs (namely, the
state of affairs of b1 and b4 being spinlike). Since it’s contradictory for states of affairs
to be both distinct and the same, slot theory has a problem.
Dixon’s solution (2008a) is that symmetrical relations have just a single slot filled by a
plurality of entities e.g. Spinlike has a single slot filled by the plurality of b1 and b4 (where
that filling would be relativised to an instantiation, or what have you). Given there’s a single
slot, there’s only ever one state of affairs—the problem is solved. But Dixon’s solution is
revisionary, making Spinlikemonadic when it’s intuitively dyadic. This occludes the prima
facie difference between (i) monadic properties instantiated by pluralities and (ii) symmetric
polyadic relations. To better understand, first distinguish the two ways to understand
‘adicity’. We might mean the number of places a relation has or we might mean the
number of things which can fill those places (cf Morton 1975: 309–10; Oliver and Smiley
2004: 615–18). For instance, the property Forming a circle—as in ‘Those points form a
circle’—appears to have one place but that place can be filled by a varying number of
points. This ambiguity in mind, I’ll stipulate that ‘adicity’ refers to places. So Forming a
circle is a monadic collective property. And it’s intuitively different from Spinlike which
appears to be dyadic (which relates two entities and has two places). Dixon’s theory makes
Spinlike akin to Forming a circle; it ends up being monadic when, intuitively, it’s dyadic.
Slotites avoid Fine’s problem whilst keeping Spinlike dyadic. Assume that slotites are
like tropes in that, just as a trope is necessarily had by whatever has it (and, e.g., my tropes
can’t be shared with anyone else), slotites are only ever plugged by whatever actually plugs
them.7 Constructing a Finean problem case is now impossible. There’s only one state of
affairs, namely b1 plugging slotite τ′1 and b4 plugging slotite τ′2. And it’s now impossible
for the reverse state of affairs to hold i.e. for b1 to plug slotite τ′2 and b4 to plug slotite τ′1.
We can now correctly capture the adicity of Spinlike:
A property/relation, Fness, is n-adic = df There are n slotites, the τs, such that (i)
each is possessed by Fness and (ii) the τs are yoked together.
7 This footnote clarifies how non-symmetric relations work, given this assumption. Recall that Abigail is taller
than Bronia (and thus Abigail plugs τ1 and Bronia plugs τ2). Had Bronia been taller than Abigail, it is not that
Abigail then plugs τ2 and Bronia plugs τ1; instead, there must now be two more—totally distinct—slotites
(e.g. τ13 and τ14) which they would’ve plugged. Thanks to a referee for pointing this out.
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For example, a symmetrical relation like Spinlike is such that it possesses pairs of
slotites i.e. always two slotites yoked together. Thus, Spinlike is dyadic.
5.4 Dimensions of Variation
The above move requires a necessary connection between slotites and those things
which plug them. Necessary connections are usually thought to be mysterious. One
way to resolve such mystery is to say that the connected entities stand in some sort of
relation of ontological dependence; that is, either the things which plug the slotites
depend upon the slotites or the slotites depend upon the things which plug them. That’s
one dimension that slotite theories may differ along.
Another dimension of variation concerns one’s take on FILLING FIRST/INSTANTIATION
FIRST/PREDICATION FIRST. We now get an additional position: Facts about what slotites are
plugged explain the instantiation facts, predicational facts, and facts about which slots are
filled. Call that PLUGGING FIRST. Once you take on-board the existence of slotites it seems
bizarre to now think that filling slots does the explaining—if you’re attracted to FILLING
FIRST you should now instead be attracted to PLUGGING FIRST. That leaves slotite theories
varying over which of INSTANTIATION FIRST, PREDICATION FIRST, and PLUGGING FIRST is true.
These two dimensions in mind, we can carve up the slotite theories into the
following:
(There may be more dimensions of variation than these two. For instance, can there
exist unplugged slotites i.e. that relation R has more slotites than merely its adicity
multiplied by the number of its instantiations? Or is every slotite plugged? Or we could
ask whether slotites depended upon properties or properties upon slotites? But I will
limit my investigation only to these two dimensions.)
6 Nominalist and Grounded Slotite Theory
Just as slot theorists may think that instantiation facts are the explanatory base for both
filling and predicational facts, slotite theorists might likewise think plugging facts are
explained by instantiation facts. Call this ‘Grounded Slotite Theory’. You won’t be a
grounded slotite theorist because of anything to do with POF. Having endorsed
INSTANTIATION FIRST, Instantiation Relative Slot Theory will work fine in solving
POF—no slotites required! But slotites will still be useful in solving the problem of
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symmetric relations. Moreover, one might be quite permissive about ontology (Schaffer
2009: 356–62) and so be committed to slotites anyhow. So there are reasons to think
that those who endorse INSTANTIATION FIRST will nonetheless endorse slotite theory and
be grounded slotite theorists.
Grounded slotite theory is worth noting. But, just as I’ve focussed on FILLING FIRST
for most of the paper, I want to focus on its slotite-equivalent, PLUGGING FIRST. So I’ll set
aside grounded slotite theory. Similarly, a slotite theory that accepts PREDICATION FIRST
(‘Nominalist slotite theory’, because the world is nominalistic at the fundamental level)
may be deserving of a proper investigation, but in the context of this paper I will move
on from it to discuss slotite theories accepting PLUGGING FIRST.
7 Byzantine Slotite Theory
It is natural to pair (i) predicational facts being grounded in plugging facts with (ii)
instances being grounded in their slotites. And it’s natural to pair (i) plugging facts being
grounded in instantiation facts with (ii) slotites being grounded in their instances. ‘Byz-
antine slotite theory’ endorses a third, unnatural, option, pairing (i) instantiation facts being
grounded in plugging facts with (ii) the slotites being grounded in their instances.
Byzantine slotite theory isn’t just weird in that respect—it’s pointlessly over-compli-
cated. Assume that bosons are fundamental and return to considering b1’s spinning. Some
fundamental fact, U, is the ultimate explanans of that predicational fact. Since b1 is
fundamental, it’s natural to think it’ll be named in U and that it’s of the form Φb1…
(whereΦ is some fundamental, joint-carving predicate). IfΦ is other thanmonadic, U is a
relational fact about b1. It can’t be a relation to a slotite, since byzantine slotite theory says
slotites are derivative and thus can’t feature in fundamental facts. Nor can it be a relation
to a property for then—surely!—Uwould be a fact about b1 instantiating the property; in
that case, instantiation facts would be explaining predicational facts, not plugging facts
(contrary to PLUGGING FIRST). Nor is it reasonable to think that it’s a relation to some
object, for b1 could spin even if the cosmos were empty of all other objects. ThusΦmust
be a monadic predicate i.e. U is of the form Φb1. U explains the fact that the relevant
slotite of Spin is plugged by b1; call that fact ‘P’. Given plugging facts are the explanation
of predicational facts, P explains H, where H is the predicational fact about ‘how b1 is’ i.e.
that b1 spins. Here’s the rub: It’s weird for U to be a monadic fact about how b1 is and not
be the predicational fact that b1 spins. If you’re going to have somemonadic fact about b1
be fundamental why not just make it the predicational fact you’re looking to explain in
the first place?Why doesn’t U=H?Why are we going all around the houses drawing lines
of explanation through plugging facts to get to H? Byzantine slotite theory is simply a
pointless complexification of nominalist slotite theory. It should be ignored.
8 Slotite Bundle Theory
8.1 Constructions of co-Plugged Slotites
On the flip side, slotites could be more fundamental than instances, presumably
grounding the instance’s existence by being constituents of them. Just as with standard
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bundle theory, where instances are constituted by properties, we would have a theory
whereby instances are constituted by slotites. Call this ‘slotite bundle theory’.
A standard bundle theorist would say of our bosons, b1 and b2, that b1 is a bundle of
two co-instantiating properties e.g. 125GeV (being the property of having a mass of
125 GeV) and Spin. Similarly, b2 is a bundle of a different pair e.g. 125GeV and Scalar
(being the property of not spinning). There’s a primitive of ‘co-instantiation’which these
properties stand-in in order to bundle themselves together and make up the instance.
Slotite bundle theorists follow suit, but using a different primitive: ‘co-plugging’.
Co-plugged slotites constitute an object. Slotite bundle theorists will think that a slotite
possessed by 125GeVand another possessed by Spin are amongst b1’s constituents. But
they should also add that b1 has amongst its constituents slotites possessed by relations.
All slotite theorists hold that, for any n-adic relation R, such that Rx1…xn is true, there
are yoked slotites τ1…τn such that τm is plugged by xm; the bundle slotite theorist adds
that τm is amongst the slotites which co-plug to comprise xm. Given slotite theory, τ′1
and τ′2 are yoked slotites possessed by Spinlike; b1 plugs τ′1 whilst b4 plugs τ′2. Given
slotite bundle theory, τ′1 is a constituent of b1 and τ′2 is a constituent of b4. This has an
interesting upshot, for now slotite bundle theory improves upon standard bundle theory.
Standard bundle theorists analyse the instantiation of monadic properties by saying that
such things are the constituents of instances, but bundle theorists are rather quieter
when it comes to relations (cf Sider 2006: 395n4). If relations aren’t constituents of
bundles, bundle theory doesn’t provide a wholly general analysis of instantiation, for it
no longer says anything about the (joint) instantiation of relations. If relations are
constituents of bundles (and, e.g., Spinlike is a constituent of b1)—which is not what
most bundle theorists believe—then, whilst we can now analyse b1’s instantiating
Spinlike, we can’t analyse its instantiating Spinlike alongside b4. Making relations
constituents of instances only tells you that they’re a relatum of some instantiation of
the relation, rather than telling us anything about which relata they are related to. Again,
we don’t have a general analysis of instantiation. Slotite bundle theory, taking a slotite
analogue of the second approach, solves this problem (because the distinct slotites are
possessed by distinct relata and there’s a primitive yoking relation to tell you which are
the relata of one and the same instantiation).
8.2 Tangent: A Problematic Alternative
I’ve just argued that slotite bundle theory is better when it comes to analysing the
instantiation of relations than standard bundle theory. Were the bundle theorist to have an
alternative solution to that problem, this would undermine the motivation for slotite bundle
theory. This section briefly discusses two alternatives, arguing that neither is suitable (and,
thus, slotite bundle theory is still attractive in offering a general analysis of instantiation).
The first alternative is to exclude relations from our ontology entirely. If there aren’t
any relations, the bundle theorist needn’t bother themselves explaining their instantia-
tion. But throughout this paper I’ve assumed some version of slot theory is true and
that’d be a pretty poor thing to assume if only monadic properties were possible
(because slot theory only becomes useful/interesting once relations are introduced).
So this response won’t work.
Hawthorne and Sider (2002: esp. 54–56) discuss a second alternative. Your bog
standard bundle theorist treats co-instantiation as a plural predicate which pluralities of
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properties fall under e.g. the plurality of Spin and 125 MeV being co-instantiated to
constitute b1. Hawthorne and Sider take it up a notch: Co-instantiation relates a varying
number of pluralities of properties. For example, b1 and b3 are spatiotemporally
seperated, thus they instantiate the relation of spatiotemporal separation—call it Dis-
tant. Thus b1 (itself a bundle of Spin and 125 MeV) and b3 (being a bundle of Scalar
and 125 MeV) jointly instantiate Distant. Hawthorne and Sider’s suggestion is that
there’s a state of affairs, D, which is the state of affairs of: Distant being co-instantiated
with (i) the plurality of Spin and 125 MeV and (ii) the plurality of Scalar and 125 MeV.
D explains b1 and b3 instantiating Distant.
But this solution has problems that slotite bundle theory does not. Co-instantiation
must now be understood in one of two ways. Either (i) co-instantiation is varigrade or
(ii) co-instantiation involves superpluralities. Either option is problematic.
Consider the varigrade approach first. Standardly, we say that properties/relations
have a fixed number of slots/places; perhaps the number of things which fill those slots
varies, but not the number of slots themselves (e.g. Forming a circle has one slot, and
that fact doesn’t vary, but it can vary over how many points collectively instantiate it).
A relation is varigrade iff it instead can have a variable number of slots/places
(Macbride 2005: 588). This first approach assumes that Hawthorne and Sider treat
co-instantiation as a varigrade relation. For instance, in D, co-instantiation would have
three slots (one for Distant, one for the plurality of Spin and 125 MeV, and one for the
plurality of Scalar and 125 MeV), whilst in other states of affairs, co-instantiation has a
different number of slots (e.g. in the case of b1 co-instantiation has just a single slot,
which is filled by the plurality of Spin and 125 MeV). So in some cases co-instantiation
has three slots and in other cases it has one slot (and in yet more cases, it has a different
number of slots). Co-instantiation is varigrade.
But varigrade relations come in for a hard time (Gilmore 2013: 229–31). Like some
others (e.g. Macbride 2005) I’mmore open to the idea of them, even at the fundamental
level. For instance, a natural reading of endurantism makes parthood fundamentally
varigrade. Mereological relations between spacetime regions, or between abstracta, are
two-place e.g. one region is a part of another simpliciter and the number 2 is part of the
real number series simpliciter. But when the mereological relation holds between
enduring objects it is three-place e.g. the wheel is a part of the car at midday––it relates
two objects and a time. If we think it’s the same relation in both cases, then the
mereological relation will be varigrade. (Perdurantists will say the same, but add that
the temporally relativised relation is derivative of the fundamental dyadic relation, thus
mereological relations aren’t fundamentally varigrade.) And it’s not just mereological
relations. For instance, the same thinking applies to location relations. In some
spacetimes, e.g. relativistic spacetimes, location is a two-place relation, whilst in a world
with enduring spatial regions and separate temporal instants, spatial location will be a
three-place relation between objects, spatial regions, and instants. If we think the same
location relation holds in both spacetimes, location is varigrade.
But whilst I’m open to the idea of varigrade relations at the fundamental level, co-
instantiation seems nothing like these examples. In these examples, the adicity of the
relation varies because it’s connecting things from wholly different ontological catego-
ries. Where the dyadic mereological relation relates spacetime regions or abstracta, the
triadic relates objects and times (or spatial regions and times). Where the dyadic
location relation relates objects to spacetime regions, the triadic location relation objects
Philosophia
to enduring spatial regions and instants. If varigradicity is plausible, it’s plausible
because in different cases there appears to be an entirely new ontological category of
entities to be relating things too. And that’s not what’s going on with co-instantiation,
where the extra places are added to make room for more of the same sort of thing (i.e.
pluralities of properties). In the different cases where the adicity of co-instantiation
varies it’s always relating properties, or pluralities of properties. It doesn’t seem like co-
instantiation is similar to other candidates for varigrade relations.
The alternative to co-instantiation being varigrade was that co-instantiation
instead involved ‘superpluralities’ (i.e. a plurality of pluralities (Rayo 2006)). On
this view, co-instantiation is always a monadic predicate with a single slot/place. In
the case of b1, co-instantiation’s sole place is filled by 125 MeVand Spin. In the case
of D, co-instantiation’s sole place is filled by a plurality of three things: (i) Distant;
(ii) the plurality of 125 MeV and Spin; and (iii) the plurality of 125 MeV and Scalar.
As this example makes clear, the co-instantiation predicate now holds of a
superplurality. The problem is that facts about co-instantiation are fundamental
facts, which would mean facts involving superplurals will be fundamental. And
that’s the bit which I baulk at; I’m fine with superplural facts being derivatively
true, but I’ve a hard time thinking that facts involving superplurals can be funda-
mentally true. (Indeed, we may have worries about whether facts involving just
straightforward plurals can be fundamental, never mind superplurals (Sider 2011:
208–16).8
8 Where:
The xs are a plural-levelling of the ys iff all and only the singular entities amongst ys’s pluralities (or
the pluralities amongst ys pluralities, or the pluralities amongst the pluralities amongst ys’s pluralities
etc.) are amongst the xs.
φ is the levelling of ψ (with regard to the xs) iff (i) φ is a proposition of the form Φ(…ys…); (ii) ψ is
a proposition of the form Φ(…xs…); (iii) the ys are a plural-levelling of the xs.
Hawthorne and Sider would also need:
LEVELLED DIFFERENCES: There are some xs such that F…xs… is true and yet a levelling of F…xs… (with
regard to the xs) is false.
LEVELLED DIFFERENCES is necessary because the plurality of Distant, 125 MeV, Spin and Scalar (being the
plural-levelling of the co-instantiating superplurality discussed in the main text) do not co-instantiate (for if
they did, there’d be something which both spins and doesn’t spin). There may be cases of false levellings of
true propositions at a non-fundamental level (consider Linnebo and Nicolas’s (2008: 193) ‘The square things
and red things overlap’) but it seems harder to believe that there are such cases at the fundamental level.
Interestingly, if LEVELLED DIFFERENCES were true, the slotite theorist might be able to analyse ‘yoking’,
achieving an ideologically lean theory analysing instantiation solely in terms of co-plugging. Given LEVELLED
DIFFERENCES, constituency is nothing like mereological parthood since pluralities of slotites could be constit-
uents of things even though no slotite amongst that plurality was itself a constituent. As an example, return to
the bosons. τ′1 and τ′2 are yoked slotites of Spinlike; b1 plugs τ′1 and b4 plugs τ′2. We could now say that the
plurality of τ′1 and τ′2 are constituents of b1 even though neither slotite is a constituent of b1. (We can also say
the same of b2.)
‘Yoking’ could then be defined:
The τs are yoked = df ∃x (x has the plurality of the τs as constituents ∧ nothing amongst the τs is itself
a constituent of x)
The plurality of τ′1 and τ′2 are yoked because something (e.g. b1) has the plurality as a constituent even
though τ′1 isn’t a constituent of it and τ′2 isn’t a constituent of it either. Then say:
x plugs slotite τ =df x is a bundle of co-plugged slotites, the ys, and either (a) τ is a slotite amongst the
ys or (b) τ is a slotite amongst some plurality that is amongst the ys.
This only works if you accept a second radical commitment: in addition to denying LEVELLED DIFFERENCES,
elementary reflection reveals that this only works if every relation is symmetric. But that is not an entirely
unheard of commitment (Dorr 2004), so––if you want ideological parsimony––this is a possible way forward.
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In short, Hawthorne and Sider’s theory is not without its challenges. Slotite bundle
theory, then, is an interesting alternative to consider if you want a general analysis of
instantiation.
8.3 Inter-Dependence
Slotite bundle theory builds everything—instances, properties, slots, tropes—out of
slotites. However, this ends up reintroducing mysterious connections. According to
slotite bundle theory, slotites won’t be able to ‘float free’ of instances any more than
properties float free of bundles according to standard bundle theory. Thus if a slotite
exists, it’s a constituent of something. Therefore, if one slotite of a relation exists, it’s a
constituent of an instance and that instance must instantiate the relation. Necessarily,
there must therefore be another (or many other) slotite(s) yoked to it. A mysterious
connection has returned because the existence of some things is now necessitated by
the existence of a distinct thing.
Above, I relieved necessary connections of their mystery by saying that one of the
connected existents depended on the other. If relations have directions, e.g. if Taller
than related the tall thing first and the shorter thing second (Grossman 1992: 57), we
could say that slotites plugged by the ‘later’ things depend on the slotite plugged by the
‘first’ thing. But this has two difficulties. First, (Fine 2000) advances compelling
reasons to deny that relations have directions. Second, we’re left in the dark when it
comes to symmetric relations, which are clearly directionless—given that the prime
candidates for fundamental relations include symmetric relations like spatiotemporal
separation (Armstrong 1978: 90), that’s particularly problematic. So this approach is a
possibility but probably unappealing.
The alternative is to say that no slotite is prior to a yoked compatriot. Instead, yoked
slotites are inter-dependent: For any plurality of (maximally) yoked slotites, each slotite
is wholly grounded in the remaining slotites. Not everything will inter-depend, since
‘unyoked’ slotites can still be fundamental, but this inter-dependence nevertheless
extends to instances: if every instance is related to at least one other instance, every
instance inter-depends upon some other instance (the view of Madhyamika Buddhism);
if any two instances are related, all instances inter-depend (the view of Huayan
Buddhism) Bliss and Priest 2017)).
Inter-dependence is contentious since it requires dependence (and/or grounding,
ontological priority, or whatever relation your metametaphysics favours) to be non-
symmetric. It’s not been popular in contemporary analytic metaphysics, which has
inclined to thinking dependence is well-founded. But inter-dependence has not gone
without defence (Barnes 2018; Thompson 2016; Thompson 2018). And whilst I’m in
no rush to accept inter-dependent entities, I’m less hostile to them than other
philosophers—after all, they didn’t seem unintuitive to Buddhist philosophers and that
fact alone should give one pause to too fervently thinking that dependence is well-
founded. Also, it’s particularly defensible in this case because, if you have any time
whatsoever for the possibility of inter-dependent entities, yoked slotites are surely the
best candidates for being inter-dependent. If you want to go inter-dependent about
anything, go inter-dependent about these things!
However, it does undermine some of the dialectical force for slotite theory in the first
place. If non-symmetric dependence relations are on the table then the original
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objection to Instantiation Relative Slot Theory (back in §2) loses its bite, for it played
on the idea that dependence was asymmetric.
9 Summary
This paper hasn’t motivated slot theory, nor defended any particular brand of it. I’ve
merely surveyed logical space, mapping out where one would find oneself were one
motivated to become a slot theorist. Here’s a pictorial summary:
I leave with some parting comments on our options. For those who endorse
PREDICATION FIRST, slot theory will work just fine—just endorse Instantiation Relative
Slot Theory and be done with it. (And, if you want slotites too, endorse nominalist
slotite theory.) And those slot theorists who believe FILLING FIRST are faced by POF. I
followed through the solutions until I arrived at slotite theory, the most plausible
version of which comes with a commitment to metaphysically inter-dependent entities.
For those who are staunchly committed to the asymmetry of all dependence relations, I
suspect that spells bad news for slotite bundle theory a fortiori bad news for FILLING
FIRST—indeed, one possible conclusion you may draw from this paper is that
(instantiation-directed) slot theorists are forced to believe PREDICATION FIRST.
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